Tuesday, August 9, 2011

Response to Fukushima Daiichi accident

1. Perform experiments to verify that a well timed rapid depressurization in the light water (BWR, PWR) reactors can avoid the ignition (ballooning and burst) of cladding of nuclear fuel in the reactor

2. Design means of well timed rapid depressurization and subsequent passive prolonged flooding of the nuclear reactor’s core and deployment of these means

3. Organization of international rapid response team and their national civil defense counterparts for nuclear emergency response coordination

4. Review of channel type reactors to verify the impossibility of development of zirconium fire in the steam (in CANDU), immediate shut down of RBMKs still operating on three sites in Russia

5. Development of evacuation procedures for the time of completion of no2 and perform mock evacuations and public trainings

6. New nuclear power plants should be developed with underground sealed containment systems as per Edward Teller’s suggestion

7. Mandatory release of data collected about the state of reactor during the accident to the public

8. Rejecting the proposals put forward by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev as offending, because at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP in Japan

a. The state provided timely and adequate response to the accident following the March 11 2011 earthquake and tsunami and minimized its impact

b. There is a well defined coordination and cooperation between the state, the operating organization and the supervisory agency in accident management to reduce its impact

c. The level of nuclear safety was not below the level corresponding to the IAEA standards, and action plans were in effect for emergencies related to the operation of nuclear power stations

d. Additional requirements were included in the regulations on nuclear power plant construction in seismic zones and in areas with a high risk of natural disasters, taking into account their possible compound effect, but a never before observed magnitude of these disasters occur

e. The proposals on the infrastructure and the level of the information to be provided about the accident, depending on its severity on the IAEA scale simply does not relate to the Japan case and may represent limitation from the current requirement of full disclosure.

9. The international world community of nuclear power users express their desire to reprehend the Russian Rosatom for their effort to divert the attention from the continued operation of unsafe RBMK units and for expressing criticism of the actions of Japan operating, government and oversight organizations, uncalled for and undeserved.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev put forward proposals to further improve international legislation on the safety of nuclear power stations.

The proposals are the result of analysis of events at the Fukushima-1 NPP in Japan and are a response to the rapid growth of civil nuclear power facilities around the world.

The initiatives propose supplementing the existing conventions and the IAEA statute with a number of provisions stipulating:

- responsibility of the state for providing a timely and adequate response to an accident in order to minimise its impact;

- the adoption of regulations for coordination and cooperation between the state, the operating organisation and the supervisory agency in accident management to reduce its impact;

- the responsibility of the states using nuclear energy to ensure the level of nuclear safety is not below the level corresponding to the IAEA standards, and the existence of action plans in each country for emergencies related to the operation of nuclear power stations;

- the requirement for the countries intending to build nuclear power facilities to establish infrastructure in accordance with IAEA recommendations and with the participation of the supplier of the nuclear plant’s equipment.

- additional requirements to be included in the regulations on nuclear power plant construction in seismic zones and in areas with a high risk of natural disasters, taking into account their possible compound effect.

- adopting regulations regarding the information to be provided about the accident, depending on its severity on the IAEA scale.

http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/2135

The above proposals of the Russian Federation on the development and safety of nuclear energy have been submitted to the IAEA and the leaders of the G8, BRICS and CIS countries.

Commentary of Presidential Aide Arkady Dvorkovich on Dmitry Medvedev’s initiatives on developing the international system for safe and secure operation of nuclear power facilities

April 26, 2011

“Per Russian President’s directive, following a thorough analysis of the events in Japan, Rosatom has prepared proposals to improve the international regulations related to the safety of nuclear power stations.

Today, the Russian Foreign Ministry submitted these proposals to the G8 countries. Considering that nuclear safety is a responsibility shared by a large number of states, the proposals have also been forwarded to Russia’s partners in BRICS, the CIS and the IAEA as an authorised international organisation. Russia expects for a discussion of its initiatives to be launched in all of these formats.

France, which currently holds the rotating presidency in the G8, has already included the issue of nuclear safety in the agenda of the upcoming G8 summit in Deauville, and Russia hopes that its proposals will form the basis for the measures adopted at the summit.”

http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/47

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